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Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Company v.
Wiscomb:
Excluding the Family Exclusion Clause
In Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co. v. Wiscomb,1 the
Washington Supreme Court invalidated a family exclusion
clause2 in an automobile insurance policy. Though noting the
Financial Responsibility Law's3 purpose of assuring protection
to innocent victims of automobile accidents, the court, neverthe-
less, limited its holding to family exclusion clauses not con-
sciously bargained for by the named insureds. By prohibiting
unbargained for family exclusion clauses, the court furthered the
policies exemplified in the Financial Responsibility Law and the
Underinsured Motorist Statute' and acted consistently with its
1. 97 Wash. 2d 203, 643 P.2d 441 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Wiscomb Ii].
2. The typical family exclusion clause reads: "This policy does not apply . . . to
bodily injury to the insured or any member of the family of the insured residing in the
same household as the insured." Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Company, Family Com-
bination Automobile Coverage, Part I, exclusion (1) (on file with the University of Puget
Sound Law Review).
3. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 46.29.(1981). The court outlined the purpose behind the
financial responsibility statute in LaPoint v. Richards, 66 Wash. 2d 585, 403 P.2d 889
(1965). The statute was "designed to give monetary protection to that ever changing and
tragically large group of persons who, while lawfully using the highways themselves, suf-
fer serious injury through the negligent use of those highways by others." Id. at 590, 403
P.2d at 893.
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.22.030(2) (1981) provides:
No new policy or renewal of an existing policy insuring against loss resulting
from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death or property damage
suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a
motor vehicle shall be issued with respect to any motor vehicle registered or
principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supple-
mental thereto for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally
entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of underinsured motor
vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because of bodily injury or death or
property damage, resulting therefrom, except while operating or occupying a
motorcycle or motordriven cycle, and except while operating or occupying a
motor vehicle owned or available for the regular use by the named insured or
any family member, and which is not insured under the liability coverage of
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decision abrogating intrafamily tort immunity. But by sug-
gesting it would uphold truly bargained for family exclusion
clauses denying coverage to named insureds, the court ignored
its own pronouncement declaring such clauses against this
state's policy of assuring compensation for the protection of
innocent victims of negligent motorists.
Mrs. Wiscomb suffered serious injuries requiring amputa-
tion of her foot when the motorcycle she was riding collided with
an automobile her husband was driving. Mrs. Wiscomb brought
a negligence action against her husband, who tendered his
defense to Mutual of Enumclaw, the insurer of both family vehi-
cles. Mutual of Enumclaw refused to provide Mr. Wiscomb's
defense, contending that the family exclusion clause in the Wis-
combs' automobile policy provided no liability coverage for Mrs.
Wiscomb's injuries. The family exclusion clause stated: "This
policy does not apply . . . (1) to bodily injury to the insured or
any member of the family of the insured residing in the same
household as the insured."' 5 (Emphasis added.) The trial court
rendered a declaratory judgment relieving the insurer from any
duty to defend Mr. Wiscomb or to pay damages to Mrs. Wis-
comb, and Mrs. Wiscomb appealed. The court of appeals
reversed, declaring the family exclusion clause void as against
public policy.7 Strongly endorsing the reasoning of the court of
appeals, the supreme court affirmed (Wiscomb I)' and, on
rehearing, reaffirmed (Wiscomb II). e
Wiscomb I relied primarily on two theories: the judicial
abrogation of the interspousal immunity doctrine"0 and the pur-
pose behind Washington's Financial Responsibility Law." The
the property: Provided, however, That the coverage for property damage need
only be offered as an optional supplemental coverage with the issuance of the
coverage for bodily injury or death.
5. See Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Company, Family Combination Automobile
Coverage, Part I, exclusion (1) (on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
6. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wiscomb, 95 Wash. 2d 373, 375, 622 P.2d 1234,
1235 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Wiscomb I].
7. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wiscomb, 25 Wash. App. 841, 611 P.2d 1304
(1980).
8. 95 Wash. 2d 373, 622 P.2d 1234 (1980).
9. 97 Wash. 2d 203, 643 P.2d 441 (1982). On rehearing, the supreme court consoli-
dated Wiscomb with Marsten v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. Marsten involved a one-
vehicle accident. In striking down the family exclusion clause, the court rejected its ear-
lier limitations on invalidating the clause only where two vehicles were involved in an
accident.
10. Wiscomb I, 95 Wash. 2d at 376-77, 622 P.2d at 1236.
11. Id. at 378-79, 622 P.2d at 1237. Both the court of appeals and the supreme court
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court examined two earlier decisions, Freehe v. Freehe,1" which
abrogated interspousal tort immunity, 13 and Borst v. Borst,"
which severely limited the scope of parent-child immunity,' 5 and
found that both decisions rejected the risk of fraud and collusion
among family members as a justification for intrafamily immu-
nity. 6 Because the family exclusion clause is premised on the
same discredited fraud and collusion rationale, consistency com-
pelled the court to again reject the rationale as an adequate rea-
son for allowing insurers to circumvent the Freehe holding.1
7
The Wiscomb I court also rested its decision on the incom-
patibility between the family exclusion clause and the financial
relied on the abrogation of interspousal immunity and on the financial responsibility
statute, though the supreme court stressed the policy underlying the financial responsi-
bility statute more than did the court of appeals. The court of appeals placed slightly
greater emphasis on the elimination of interspousal immunity. On rehearing, the
supreme court dropped its reliance on the abrogation of interspousal immunity. How-
ever, it did note that just as the threat of fraud and collusion could not justify continu-
ance of the immunity doctrine, the threat could not justify the family exclusion clause in
liability coverage.
12. 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972). In Freehe, a husband sought recovery for
personal injuries sustained because of the defendant-wife's negligent maintenance of a
tractor and failure to warn him of the tractor's unsafe condition. The farm, where the
injury occurred, was the separate property of the wife. Although recognizing the coexis-
tence of business liability and personal liability, the court expressly rejected interspousal
tort immunity. Id. at 192, 500 P.2d at 778.
13. Interspousal immunity originated in the common law notion that a married
woman had no separate legal identity apart from her husband. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 859-64 (4th ed. 1971). Parent-child immunity originated in three American state
court decisions referred to as the "Great Trilogy." The Washington Supreme Court has
the distinction of being the author of one of those three landmark opinions. In Roller v.
Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905), the court refused a minor daughter the right to
bring a civil action for rape against her father, fearing that the lawsuit would rupture
harmonious domestic relations on which the welfare of our entire civilization is based. Id.
at 242-43, 79 P. at 788. The Washington court later rejected the faulty logic of the Roller
court in Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d 411, 610 P.2d 891 (1980), terming the domes-
tic harmony rationale "unreal." Id. at 413, 610 P.2d at 892.
The doctrine applied only to tort claims. Intrafamily lawsuits over contract and
property matters, though potentially of equal or greater disruptive effect, have never
been barred by the doctrine. See W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 866.
14. 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952). In Borst, the Washington Supreme Court
soundly rejected the possibility of fraud and collusion as a valid justification for prevent-
ing a child who was run over by his father's truck from suing his negligent parent. The
court refused to find that a greater opportunity for fraud in a particular class of cases
warrants immunizing all tortfeasors within that class, favoring instead an approach
which insures compensation for the victim.
15. In Borst, the court abolished parent-child immunity where the parent is acting
in a business, rather than a parental, capacity. Id. at 656, 251 P.2d at 156-57.
16. Wiscomb I, 95 Wash. 2d at 376, 622 P.2d at 1236.
17. Id. at 380-81, 622 P.2d at 1238.
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responsibility statute. 8 The Financial Responsibility Law indi-
cates legislative intent to ensure compensation for innocent vic-
tims of negligent motorists. 9 Failure to compensate an innocent
victim, even if a member of the tortfeasor's family, is contrary to
that intent.
On rehearing,2 ° though reaching the same conclusion, the
supreme court adopted a substantially new posture regarding
the family exclusion clauses. Once again the court rejected the
threat of fraudulent and collusive suits as justification for the
clause. 21 Additionally, the Wiscomb H court responded to the
insurer's argument that the insurance contract was a valid pri-
vate contract. The court agreed that, "unless inconsistent with
public policy or some statutory provision, '22 the insurer may
limit its liability. After examining Washington statutes, the
court pronounced the clause inconsistent with the public policy
18. Id. at 380, 622 P.2d at 1238. The Wiscomb I court also rejected three other
arguments proferred by the insurer. First, the insurer failed to substantiate its assertion
that invalidating the family exclusion clause would result in higher insurance rates. Sec-
ond, the court felt that courtroom procedures, coupled with diligent insurer use of the
breach of cooperation clause defense, would adequately protect insurers against fraudu-
lent and collusive intrafamily claims. Third, insurer's counsel stated at oral argument
that an insurance consumer in Washington cannot purchase a policy without the clause.
The court, therefore, concluded that the freedom of contract theory could not realisti-
cally be invoked to uphold the family exclusion clause.
The court rejected petitioner's argument that invalidating the family exclusion
clause would inevitably result in higher insurance rates, because no evidence exists that
insurance premiums in states forbidding the inclusion of the family exclusion clause are
higher as a result of greater insurer exposure to risk of loss. Even if substantiation for
this argument could be found, proof of higher rates could not justify preservation of the
family exclusion clause because insurance costs are simply not a legitimate factor for the
courts to consider in determining whether to exclude an entire group of persons from
compensation. In abolishing the gross negligence standard in guest-host automobile neg-
ligence actions in Roberts v. Johnson, 91 Wash. 2d 182, 588 P.2d 201 (1978), the supreme
court firmly rejected the notion that insurance rates should bear on judicial determina-
tions. The suggestion that
one class of injured persons should be forced to accept their loss without com-
pensation, in order that the public generally may enjoy lower insurance rates
. ..is hardly compatible with principles of equality ....
In any event, the high cost of insurance . . . cannot be a controlling con-
sideration where the court is asked to determine the rule of law which will best
serve the cause of justice.
Id. at 187, 588 P.2d at 204.
19. Wiscomb I, 95 Wash. 2d at 378-79, 622 P.2d at 1237. The court cited LaPoint v.
Richards, 66 Wash. 2d 585, 403 P.2d 889 (1965), which explained the compensatory pur-
pose of the statute. See supra note 3.
20. Wiscomb II, 97 Wash. 2d 203, 643 P.2d 441 (1982).
21. Id. at 210, 643 P.2d at 444-45.
22. Id. at 210, 643 P.2d at 445.
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of compensating innocent victims of automobile accidents.23 The
court, however, limited its holding, intimating that it would
uphold freely bargained for clauses, though only those clauses
excluding coverage for the named parties to the bargained for
contract.24 Nonetheless, because the Wiscombs could not
purchase an automobile liability policy in Washington without
the clause,25 the court determined that this family exclusion
clause was not the product of free bargaining between the par-
ties. The court, therefore, rejected the insurer's freedom of con-
tract argument that the Wiscombs had bargained for the clause,
and refused to invoke that theory to uphold the clause. More-
over, noting that the majority now recognized that the Financial
Responsibility Law allows various methods of demonstrating
financial responsibility, Justice Dolliver, dissenting in Wiscomb I
from the view that insurance was the only means to comply with
financial responsibility laws, concurred in Wiscomb II. He pre-
ferred the view that denying family members insurance coverage
via the family exclusion clause contravened public policy man-
dating invalidation even when the parties bargained for such
clauses.
To explain its invalidation of the family exclusion clause in
Wiscomb II, the court relied on two sources of policy. 26 First, the
court examined the state's Financial Responsibility Law. That
statute requires proof of financial responsibility when a person
has been involved in an automobile accident resulting in bodily
injury or death of any person or property damage of $300 or
23. Id. at 213, 643 P.2d at 446.
24. Stating that if certain conditions were met a family exclusion clause may be
valid, the court expressly reserved the question of the validity of such clauses. The con-
ditions to be met include the following: an opportunity to escape or accept the clause,
not simply a take-it-or-leave-it choice, proof that that clause was called to the insured's
attention, and a narrow tailoring of the clause to exclude coverage only when named
insureds residing in the same household are injured. Id. at 211, 643 P.2d at 446. See also
infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
25. Id. at 211, 643 P.2d at 445. In Wiscomb I, the court stated that counsel for
Mutual of Enumclaw admitted during oral argument that automobile policies without
family exclusion clauses are unavailable in Washington. The court is certainly correct
that a policyholder who desired bodily injury liability coverage for intrafamily injuries
could not bargain with his insurer for this additional coverage, and that automobile
insurance policies without family exclusions are virtually unavailable in Washington.
Wiscomb I, 95 Wash. 2d at 381 n.1, 622 P.2d at 238 n.1. One Washington insurer, how-
ever, Safeco Insurance Company, has never employed the family exclusion clause in its
automobile insurance policies. See Safeco Insurance Company, Family Automobile Pol-
icy (on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
26. Wiscomb II, 97 Wash. 2d at 206-09, 643 P.2d at 442-44.
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more.27 Once an accident has been reported by any injured per-
son, the other party must demonstrate financial responsibility
for potential victims in the future in one of four ways: (1) file a
certificate of insurance, (2) post a bond, (3) deposit securities in
the amount of $60,000, or (4) provide a certificate of self-insur-
ance. 28 By providing for both past and potential victims, the
statute suggests a legislative intent to assure compensation to
those injured through another's negligent use of our highways.29
Second, the court recognized that the same public policy
pervades the Underinsured Motorist Statute.30 That statute
gives an insured a right to purchase coverage for injuries caused
by an uninsured or an inadequately insured motorist.3 While
the statute allows the insured to opt out of uninsured motorist
coverage and thus avoid the increased premiums for such pro-
tection,32 the statute, nevertheless, assures the victim an oppor-
tunity to recover damages from his own insurer when the
tortfeasor's insurance is inadequate. 3
The court properly recognized that the family exclusion
clause strikes at the heart of the public policy of assuring com-
pensation to highway victims. 3 ' On one hand, the Financial
Responsibility Law and the Underinsured Motorist Statute
assure compensation to victims of negligent drivers. The family
exclusion clause, on the other hand, denies compensation to a
class of innocent victims most exposed to the negligence of the
insured driver. The exclusion denies coverage not on the basis of
any act peculiarly associated with the insured driver, but instead
depends strictly on the identity of the victim, the person who
has no control over the vehicle's operation. 5
The Wiscomb If court also rejected protection of the insurer
from fraudulent and collusive suits as a justification for the fam-
ily exclusion clause.3 6 Citing Hartford Accident & Indemnity
27. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.29.060 (1981).
28. Id. § 46.29.450.
29. Wiscomb II, 97 Wash. 2d at 207, 643 P.2d at 443.
30. Id. at 208, 643 P.2d at 444.
31. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.22.030 (1981).
32. The statute expressly allows the insured to reject all or part of the underinsured
coverage. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.22.030 (1981).
33. See Comment, Washington's Underinsured Motorist Statute: Balancing the
Interests of Insurers and Insureds, 55 WASH. L. REV. 819 (1980).
34. Wiscomb II, 97 Wash. 2d at 208, 643 P.2d at 444.
35. Id. at 209, 643 P.2d at 444.
36. Id. at 209-10, 643 P.2d at 445.
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Co. v. Novak,3 7 the court noted that the threat of fraud and col-
lusion had not prevented invalidation of the "physical contact"
requirement for uninsured motorist coverage a.3  The court also
noted its basis for rejecting the threat of fraud and collusion as a
justification for the now abandoned doctrine of intrafamily tort
immunity. 9
The fraud or collusion rationale argues that the availability
of insurance proceeds induces persons to file fraudulent claims
or exaggerate legitimate claims in situations where the reward
for such claims may inure to the insured. ° In the context of
intrafamily tort immunity, insurers argue that their deep pocket
provides a great temptation for dishonest families to take advan-
tage of their insurance companies, particularly since not only the
injured party but the entire family will share in the recovery.4'
Supporters of the immunity doctrine and of the family exclusion
clause contend that this risk of fraud or collusion and the sup-
posed general jury predisposition toward plaintiffs when jurors
suspect that the real defendant is an insurance company 2 make
an intrafamily lawsuit extremely difficult to defend successfully.
Courts, however, have concluded that greater opportunity for
fraud and collusion among family members does not justify
denying recovery to all.' 3  Courts and juries, the argument goes,
can effectively "ferret out the meritorious from the fraudulent in
particular cases.'4
In rejecting the fraud or collusion rationale as support for
intrafamily tort immunity and the physical contact requirement,
37. 83 Wash. 2d 576, 520 P.2d 1368 (1974).
38. Wiscomb II, 97 Wash. 2d at 210, 643 P.2d at 445.
39. Id.
40. See Kay v. Kay, 30 Utah 2d 94, 513 P.2d 1372 (1973); Casey, The Trend of
Interspousal and Parental Immunity-Cakewalk Liability, 45 INS. COUNSEL J. 321
(1978); and Maliner, Intrafamily Immunity Doctrine: The Breached Wall, 5 FORUM 58
(1969), for views on the difficulties of defending intrafamily lawsuits.
41. See Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955). "Remove from a defen-
dant the risk of loss and substitute the covert hope of profit and a situation arises which
should give us pause." Id. at 310-11, 287 P.2d at 583.
42. Id. at 311, 287 P.2d at 583. "[W]e know that juries are, as a Kentucky mountain-
eer once said-'tolerable generous with other people's money', especially when the aroma
of insurance permeates the room." But see Smith, The Miscegenetic Union of Liability
Insurance and Tort Process in the Personal Injury Claims System, 54 CORNELL L. REV.
645, 667 (1969), where the author suggests that as insurance consumers, jurors might be
rationally predisposed toward the insured defendant in order to keep insurance rates
down.
43. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 653, 251 P.2d 149, 155 (1952).
44. Id.
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the courts have replaced an earlier solicitude for the plight of
the insurer with a policy supporting compensation of innocent
tort victims.'5 As a result, the Wiscomb courts had little diffi-
culty concluding the rationale could not support the family
exclusion clause as well.46 As with its previous decisions, the
court reasoned that the judicial process would adequately pro-
tect insurance carriers.'
7
The Wiscomb courts correctly perceived the need for consis-
tency in rejecting the fraud rationale. In fact, by striking down
family exclusion clauses, the court pulled the plug on the life
support mechanism used to keep intrafamily tort immunity
alive.' 8 The court also correctly determined that family exclu-
sion clauses are inconsistent with the policy favoring recovery by
innocent victims of negligent drivers. Deviating significantly
from its earlier decision, however, the court limited its appar-
ently broad rejection of family exclusions by stating in dicta that
it may uphold some family exclusions where only those insured
fall within the clause's parameters.' 9 The court identified three
coverage restrictions that must exist before it would consider
upholding the clause: (1) the clause's presence or absence must
be the product of free bargaining between the insurance com-
pany and the named insureds, (2) the clause may only apply to
the injuries to the named insureds (i.e., those whose acts the
45. The courts have overwhelmingly rejected the fraud and collusion rationale. See,
e.g., Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 695, 376 P.2d 70, 73, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 105 (1962);
Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ind. 1972); Mosier v. Varney, 376 Mich. 532,
549, 138 N.W.2d 343, 347 (1965); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 363-64, 150 A. 905, 911
(1930); Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 556, 388 A.2d 951, 962 (1978); Immer v. Risko,
56 N.J. 482, 489, 267 A.2d 481, 485 (1970) (limited solely to motor vehicle accidents in
Steward v. Borough of Magnolia, 134 N.J. Super. 312, 340 A.2d 678 (1975)); Felderhoff v.
Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 932 (Tex. 1971); Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 725 (W.Va.
1976). Many courts and commentators who ultimately reject the danger of fraud and
collusion as a legitimate basis for barring all intrafamily suits at least acknowledge that
the likelihood of fraud and collusion in these suits is somewhat greater than in ordinary
suits. Some authorities, however, reject this notion outright. In Comer, the court found it
hard to believe that courts would be flooded with cases brought by litigants seeking
recovery who have "flung themselves down the cellar steps or permitted the other spouse
to strike them with the family car." Id. at 725. Widespread collusion in intrafamily suits
is likely, according to one authority, "only under a rather paranoid view of human
nature." Smith, supra note 42, at 673.
46. Wiscomb II, 97 Wash. 2d at 210, 643 P.2d at 445.
47. See id.
48. See Bland, Family Immunity and Household Exclusions in Washington, 3
WASH. ST. TaiAL L.J. 13 (1979). Bland argues that family immunity can be buried once
and for all only by repudiating household exclusions.
49. Wiscomb II, 97 Wash. 2d at 212-13, 643 P.2d at 446.
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policy insures) residing in the same household, and (3) the insur-
ance company must offer the exclusion on more than a take-it-
or-leave-it basis.5 0 Thus, though the Wiscomb II court expressly
reserved deciding whether clauses reflecting those elements are
valid,"' the family exclusion clause still lives. Upon addressing
the reserved question, the court should declare all family exclu-
sion clauses invalid.
The public policy mandating exclusion of family exclusion
clauses remains the same regardless of the bargained for nature
of the contract. In Wiscomb II, the court correctly determined
that the state's Financial Responsibility Law and Underinsured
Motorist Statute reflect a legislative concern to provide for inno-
cent victims of negligence on the highways.51 Moreover, those
statutes are complementary in assuring that protection. The
Financial Responsibility Law attempts to assure that only driv-
ers capable of providing for their potential victims will use the
highways.53 But if a negligent driver fails to comply with the
Financial Responsibility Law, the underinsured motorist provi-
sions operate as a fail-safe, allowing the victim to protect him-
self. Requiring only that insurers offer underinsured coverage
with every automobile insurance policy, the statute is not
thwarted when insureds bargain for reduced premiums by
excluding such coverage.
The denial of coverage through the family exclusion clause,
however, is not analogous to the rejection of underinsured
motorist coverage. In each circumstance, ostensibly the potential
victim is only bargaining with his own right to recover. In the
case of underinsured motorist coverage, the victim's rejection of
a chance to recover does not contravene the public policy of
assuring that negligent drivers compensate innocent victims.
The potential victim merely elects to bear the risk of not recov-
ering should injury occur. Furthermore, statutory provisions
expressly allow such a rejection."
The family exclusion clause, on the other hand, does more
than simply shift the risk to the victim. It allows the negligent
driver to bargain away the family victim's insurance protection,
typically the only meaningful opportunity for full compensation.
50. Id. at 212, 643 P.2d at 446.
51. Id. at 213, 643 P.2d at 446.
52. Id. at 207-08, 643 P.2d at 443-44.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
54. WASH. REv. CODE § 48.22.030(4) (1981).
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Even if the family victim concurred in the arrangement, the sole
effect of the family exclusion clause remains the elimination of
the driver's responsibility under the insurance policy for the
injuries his negligence caused. Negligent drivers should not be
allowed to exclude insurance protection because of the victim's
identity. Further, the nature of the relationship between the
tortfeasor and the victim justifies an insured's rejection of unin-
sured motorist coverage. The injured victim can pursue compen-
sation under the Financial Responsibility Law's other provisions
when the tortfeasor is not a family member; the opposite is true
when the tortfeasor and victim are part of the same family. The
likelihood of a family member victim pursuing a claim for dam-
ages against another family member is slight.5 As a practical
55. Historically, the primary justification for the intrafamily immunity doctrine was
preservation of family harmony, which courts reasoned would suffer irreparable damage
if family members were allowed to bring tort actions against each other. See W. PRossER,
supra note 13, at 859-64; McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43
HARV. L. REv. 1030 (1930); Comment, Tort Actions Between Members of the Fam-
ily-Husband & Wife-Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. REv. 152 (1961). In abolishing parent-
child immunity, courts never suggested that family harmony was not an appropriate con-
sideration. On the contrary, courts concluded that because of the prevalence of insur-
ance, family harmony would be better preserved by allowing intrafamilial suits since any
damage award would be paid by the parent's insurer, not by the parent. Thus, judicial
abandonment of the immunity doctrine rested on the assumption that most people carry
liability insurance and that family members would not sue unless there was insurance.
If insureds are allowed to bargain away liability coverage for family members, the
assumption that insurance protects family harmony is unfounded. Courts should invali-
date family exclusion clauses in order to preserve family harmony. See infra text accom-
panying notes 58-60.
Though preservation of domestic harmony was the primary justification for the
intrafamily immunity doctrine, courts and commentators soon developed others. In addi-
tion to the family harmony rationale, interspousal immunity was premised on the com-
mon law legal unity of husband and wife, the avoidance of trivial matrimonial disputes,
the notion that adequate remedies were available in criminal and divorce courts, and the
protection of insurers against fraud and collusion. See W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at
859-64; see also McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv. L.
REV. 1030 (1930); Comment, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family-Husband &
Wife-Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. REv. 152 (1961); Comment, Interspousal Tort Immu-
nity: An Analysis of the Law in Washington and Oregon, 8 WLAam r L.J. 427 (1972).
In addition to the family harmony rationale, parent-child immunity rested on a faulty
analogy to interspousal immunity. The parallel was misplaced because interspousal
immunity was based on the common law notion that a husband and wife were legally one
entity; the parent and child never were considered legally one. See McCurdy, supra note
55, for a persuasive condemnation of this faulty rationale. Other rationales for parent-
child immunity include protection of parental discipline and control, preservation of the
family exchequer, and, more recently, avoidance of fraud and collusion. See Greenstone,
Abolition of Intrafamilial Immunity, 7 FORUM 82 (1972); Sanford, Personal Torts
Within the Family, 9 VAND. L. Rev. 823 (1956); Comment, Intrafamilial Tort Immunity
in New Jersey: Dismantling the Barrier to Personal Injury Litigation, 10 RuT.-CAm. L.
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matter, the family will bear the full out-of-pocket costs of the
injury with no possibility of recovering under any of the Finan-
cial Responsibility Law's non-insurance provisions.
Moreover, contrary to the decision regarding uninsured
motorist coverage, the criteria bearing on a decision to include
the family exclusion clause provide disincentives to purchase the
protection. An individual considering uninsured motorist protec-
tion is, at the time of the purchase, addressing the risk of injury
caused by an unknown driver, of unknown personality and
financial capacity, in an unknown situation occurring on the
road. The decisionmaking process balances the cost of such cov-
erage against the risk posed by this unknown force. Here, the
perceived risk is high and the relative cost to avoid these risks is
low. Under those conditions the purchaser is less disposed to
refuse the needed coverage."
An individual considering the family exclusion clause, how-
ever, faces different criteria. Here the individual weighs the risk
of injury caused by a member of the family, whose behavior and
driving habits are known. Under these conditions the purchaser
REv. 661 (1979); Comment, The "Reasonable Parent" Standard: An Alternative to Par-
ent-Child Tort Immunity, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 795 (1976); Comment, Defining the Par-
ent's Duty After Rejection of Parent-Child Immunity: Parental Liability for Emotional
Injury to Abandoned Children, 33 VAND. L. REV. 775 (1980); Comment, The Demise of
Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 12 WLLAMErrE L.J. 605 (1976).
Washington carried the parental immunity doctrine to an absurd extreme in Roller
v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905), in which the court barred a daughter from
suing her father for rape, basing its decision on the family harmony and parental disci-
pline rationale.
56. That the insured is likely to have purchased uninsured or underinsured motorist
coverage does nothing to obviate the need for rejecting the family exclusion clause. First,
even when the individual has purchased uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage,
that coverage, like the general coverage, limits liability towards family members. The
Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Company automobile policy, for example, provides that
an underinsured motor vehicle does not include one "owned by or furnished or available
for the regular use of the insured or any family member unless the injured person was
neither operating nor occupying such vehicle at the time of the accident." Mutual of
Enumclaw Insurance Company, Automobile Policy § IIIA(4)(a) (1980) (on file with the
University of Puget Sound Law Review). This restrictive definition of an uninsured/
underinsured motor vehicle has the effect of precluding a family member, injured by
another family member's negligence, from collecting under his own uninsured/underin-
sured coverage.
Second, even when no such policy provision applies, the Washington Court of
Appeals has ruled that an automobile covered by a policy containing a family exclusion
clause is not an uninsured motor vehicle within the meaning of WASH. REV. CODE §
48.22.030 (1981). United Pacific Ins. Co. v. McCarthy, 15 Wash. App. 70, 546 P.2d 1226
(1976). The injured family member thus has no statutory right to claim uninsured or
underinsured motorist coverage under the policy.
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is likely to perceive the risk as low and the relative cost as high.
Given those considerations, the purchaser will more likely select
the less expensive option and include the family exclusion
clause. The considerations assure that a family with the least
ability to provide for itself financially in the event of injury will
be the family most likely to elect the family exclusion clause and
its diminished coverage.25
Second, the family exclusion clause, whether bargained for
or not, breeds contempt for the state's accident reporting stat-
utes and its Financial Responsibility Law. Under the reporting
statutes, a driver in an accident involving personal injury, death,
or property damage in excess of $300 must report the accident.58
If the damage exceeded $300 the Financial Responsibility Law
becomes operative, requiring evidence of financial capacity for
both the accident triggering that law and all future accidents as
well." If the victim is not a family member, triggering these
statutes serves to enhance the possibility of recovering damages
from the tortfeasor. However, because an injured family member
will not, in most circumstances, bring suit in the absence of
insurance,60 and because moral and legal obligations assure min-
imal care in the absence of such a suit,61 the incentive does not
exist to comply or force compliance with those statutes. Free of
those incentives, persons involved in automobile accidents are
likely to ignore both the reporting statute and the Financial
57. Presumably the legislature realized that only a tiny fraction of those required to
show financial responsibility could or would consider an alternative other than insurance
to comply with the Financial Responsibility Law. One could argue, then, that the legisla-
ture enacted the Financial Responsibility Law to distribute losses resulting from auto-
mobile accidents over a large segment of society through the medium of insurance rates.
See Comment, Virginia's Intrafamily Immunity Decisions: What Public Policy Giveth,
Will the Insurance Policy Taketh Away?, 22 CATH. U.L. REv. 167, 174-75 (1972). It is
axiomatic that the smaller the population, the less those costs will be dispersed. See
James & Thornton, The Impact of Insurance on the Law of Torts, 15 LAw & CoNTEm.
PROBS. 431, 439 (1950). Thus, to the extent that many insureds choose family exclusion
clauses, those policies providing family coverage will cost proportionally more. When cost
is prohibitive, freedom of contract can hardly be said to exist.
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.52.030 (1981).
59. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 46.29 (1981).
60. See James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,
57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948); Comment, Intrafamily Tort Immunity in New Jersey: Disman-
tling the Barrier to Personal Injury Litigation, 10 Rurr.-CAM. L. REV. 661 (1980); Com-
ment, The Demise of Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 12 Wn.LAsMTsr L.J. 605 (1976);
Note, Intrafamily Tort Immunity in Virginia: A Doctrine in Decline, 21 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 273 (1979).




Nor do exclusions from underinsured coverage thwart pub-
lic policy. Courts will uphold such exclusions. The Underinsured
Motorist Statute itself expressly provides certain exclusions . 2 It
permits the insurer to restrict underinsured motorist coverage
when the insured is operating a motorcycle. s A driver of a
motorcycle exposes himself to much greater danger of increased
injury and higher injury cost. As with general exclusions, an
insurer can avoid assuming risks associated with the nature of
the driver." The insurer also can deny coverage if the insured is
occupying an uninsured motor vehicle owned or available for
regular use by the named insured or any family member.6 Oth-
erwise, the insurer is, in effect, insuring more than one family
vehicle for the cost of a policy covering only one car. In addition,
the Underinsured Motorist Statute allows contractual provisions
prohibiting "stacking" or aggregating multiple insurance cover-
age,66 thereby limiting the insured's recovery to a single policy of
underinsured motorist protection. Thus, while the clause consid-
ered in Wiscomb II "excluded from protection an entire class of
innocent victims for no good reason,"6 the Underinsured Motor-
ist Statute exclusions are justified. The statute's exclusions are
not intended to prevent compensation. They simply avoid
overcompensation.
In fact, exclusions from automobile coverage itself can be
valid when they do not depend on the identity of the excluded
victim as prohibited by public policy. Thus, courts have per-
mitted other exclusions directed at persons having control over
the vehicle's risks peculiarly associated with the nature of the
driver, as Wiscomb II noted.69 Courts have allowed insurers to
exclude coverage when an automobile is driven by a person
below the age of twenty-five,70 or when driven by one other than
62. WASH. REv. CODE § 48.22.030(2) (1981).
63. Id.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
65. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.22.030(2) (1981).
66. Id. See also Comment, Washington's Underinsured Motorist Statute: Balanc-
ing the Interests of Insurers and Insureds, supra note 33, at 823.
67. Wiscomb II, 97 Wash. 2d at 208, 643 P.2d at 444.
68. Id. at 209, 643 P.2d at 444.
69. Id.
70. To illustrate, the Wiscomb H court cited St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Circle Bar J Boys' Ranch, Inc., 1 Wash. App. 377, 461 P.2d 567 (1969), petition denied,
77 Wash. 2d 962 (1970). Wiscomb I, 97 Wash. 2d at 209, 643 P.2d at 444.
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the driver specifically designated in the policy.7 Pointing out
that allowable exclusions "focused on the increased risk attend-
ant with operation of the vehicle by one other than a person the
insurer had agreed to insure,"72 the Wiscomb II court granted
that an insurer can limit coverage regarding such risks when not
contemplated by both contracting parties. 73 In contrast, the fam-
ily exclusion clause limits coverage to risks not peculiarly associ-
ated with the negligent driver, but merely associated with family
membership.
Denying coverage by focusing on victims to be excluded
does not comport with exclusions courts have upheld. Though
the financial responsibility statute does not mandate liability
insurance as the means to compensate victims, whether family
members or not, as a practical matter, insurance is probably the
only way most people can comply with the statute's provisions.
Carving out a group from that protection thwarts the compensa-
tory scheme of the Financial Responsibility Law, a law providing
no exceptions for anyone, not even family members. Moreover,
when an accident involves a family member, the compensation
the financial responsibility statute attempts to assure is guaran-
teed only when insurance is the means used to comply with that
law. Absent insurance, it is unlikely that a victim will sue a fam-
ily member to recover damages for his injuries.74 At most, the
family member-victim would assert legal claims to assure medi-
cal care when necessary.75 Thus, without insurance the family
member will recover only for his medical costs, not the myriad
other damages that may exist; for example, pain and suffering
damages go unmet. Without the pressures of a lawsuit, permit-
ting insureds to bargain out of coverage for family members thus
allows the insured a purely economic choice regarding whether
to purchase family protection and fully meet his victim's poten-
tial loss, or not to purchase the protection and meet only the
costs of medical care. In essence, the extent of the victim's
71. As an example, the Wiscomb II court cited Royse v. Boldt, 80 Wash. 2d 44, 491
P.2d 644 (1971), refusing to invalidate a provision excluding coverage for any accident in
which a driver other than the named insured, a resident of his household, or a driver
specifically named in the policy was operating the vehicle. It also cited Barkwill v.
Englen, 57 Wash. 2d 545, 358 P.2d 317 (1961), approving a policy containing a "student
and serviceman's endorsement." Wiscomb II, 97 Wash. 2d at 209, 643 P.2d at 444.
72. Wiscomb II, 97 Wash. 2d at 209, 643 P.2d at 444.
73. Id.
74. See supra note 55.
75. See WASH. REv. CovE §§ 26.16.030, .16.205 (1981).
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recovery is in the tortfeasor's hands. And, as Justice Dolliver
noted in Wiscomb II: "If the reason for public policy against
family exclusion clauses is to protect innocent victims, they need
to be protected against a penurious or unthinking head of the
family as well as the underwriting policies of an insurance com-
pany."7 Allowing the head of the family to bargain away his
victim's recovery does not offer that protection.
In the Wiscomb decisions the Washington Supreme Court
faced an insurance policy excluding a broad class of victims who
face the greatest risk of injury from the insured's actions. In
Wiscomb I, the court correctly identified that the family exclu-
sion clause contravened public policy, as gleaned from other
statutes, to insure compensation for the injuries of innocent vic-
tims of negligent drivers, and rejected the threat of fraud or col-
lusion as grounds to uphold that clause. The court soundly
rejected the clause's validity. In Wiscomb II, the court reaf-
firmed its earlier decision, though limiting its holding to clauses
not freely bargained for and those excluding family members
other than the named insureds. Because the same policy consid-
erations operate regardless of the bargained for nature of the
clause, and because upholding a family exclusion clause under
any circumstance virtually denies recovery to the injured family
member, the court should strike down all family exclusion
clauses. Only then will the court honor the policies enunciated in
the Financial Responsibility Law and ensure compliance with
the accident reporting statute."
Janice L. Campton
76. Wiscomb II, 97 Wash. 2d at 214-15, 643 P.2d at 447 (Dolliver J., concurring).
77. Ideally, the legislature should prohibit family exclusions in liability insurance
policies, thus guaranteeing that the compensatory policies underlying judicial decisions,
the Financial Responsibility Law, and the Underinsured Motorist Statute are effectu-
ated. At least three states, New Jersey, Oregon, and Wisconsin, statutorily prohibit fam-
ily exclusion clauses in automobile liability insurance policies. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39: 6A-4
(1969); OR. REv. STAT. § 743.800 (1974); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 204.34(2) (1957). Political
reality suggests, however, that a legislative solution favorable to the consumer is not
likely soon. Because the courts are the guardians of the public interest, they should not
hesitate to police the family exclusion clause themselves until insurance company poli-
cies comply with public policy.
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